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Abstract 
The debate on development of Kosovar identity, initiated after the war of 1998-99 in Kosovo, began 
initially promulgating the differences of Albanian language dialects to give voice to the new political 
circumstances after the declaration of independence. The main argument of this debate revolves 
around two extremes: the existence or non-existence of the Kosovar identity as a national identity. 
Such a debate is seen as a challenge to Albanian identity. This article argues that both these positions 
hold some valid reasoning, however the development of an identity into a national one is a much 
more complex premise than dialectical differences in speech or the existence of an independent state. 
The article discusses how Albanian identity is still powerful for the majority of the Kosovo population 
and examines the prospects of the Kosovar identity to replace the power of the Albanian identity. The 
article concludes that Kosovar identity contains many favourable ingredients to develop as a 
national identity, however it is still soon to be considered one and that such development depends on 
political circumstances, mostly international and less national.  
Introduction 
Albanian national identity developed through different phases throughout its history 
experiencing different challenges. Many factors like isolation, political systems, 
religion/s,1 education and inter-ethnic relations with other nations of the Balkans, 
played particular and important roles in the shaping and development of national 
identity. 2 However, the most important factor that shaped the way Albanian identity 
developed in the Balkans is the fact that more than half of the Albanian population 
found itself living outside of the nation-state of Albania following the dissolution of 
the Ottoman Empire in late 19th and early 20th century.3 
1 Albanians are a multi-religious society. 
2 N. Clayer, Në fillimet e nacionalizmit shqiptar: Lindja e një kombi me shumicë myslimane në Evropë, 
translated from French by Artan Puto, Marin Barleti Tiranë, 2012; I. Blumi, ‘The Role of Education in the 
Formation of Albanian Identity and its Myths’, in Schwandner-Sievers, S. & Fischer B.J. (eds) Albanian 
Identities: Myth and History, Indiana University Press, Bloomington & Indianapolis, 2002, pp. 49-59. 
3 This article will not cover the historical developments that led to the establishment of the nation-states in the 
Balkans in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, following the break-up of the Ottoman Empire. There is a vast 
literature on historic developments as well as about the distribution of the Albanian population throughout the 
Balkans and the circumstances how they remained outside of their established nation-state. See for example: J. 
Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War, University of California Press, 1999; G. Duijzings, 
Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo, London: Hurst & Company, 2000; N. Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short 
History (Updated with a New Preface), New York: New York University Press, 1999; H. Poulton and M. Vickers, 
"Kosovo Albanians: Ethnic Confrontation with the Slavic State," in H. Poulton and S. Taji-Frouki (eds.), Muslim 
Identity and the Balkan State, London: Hurst & Co, 1997; Arshi Pipa and Sami Repishti, eds., Studies on Kosova, 
Boulder: East European Monographs, 1984; Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich, The Establishment of the 
Balkan National States, 1804 – 1920, Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1977; Edwin E Jacques, The 
Albanians: An Ethnic History from Prehistoric Times to the Present, NC and London: McFarland & Co 1995 
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The promoters of the Kosovar identity as national one, approach this debate through 
the framework of Universalist theories emphasising the universal characteristic of 
modern state and its relationship to group identities. The canonical works of Gellner, 
Smith, Anderson or Hobsbawm are the foundation used to build the thesis of the 
Kosovar national identity.4 However, as Eriksen points out the strengths of these 
approaches suggesting that they need to be supplemented with the experiential world 
of the everyday life of the actors (Lebenswelt),5 in the context of Kosovo this is of 
paramount relevance in terms of flexibility and the fluidity of the character of the 
human identification. Discussing the development of the Kosovar identity, a 
combination of different criteria such as language, ethnicity, political demands for 
greater autonomy or independence, history, institutionalism, subjective 
imagination,6 voluntarism or invention,7 are relevant. 
The process of the development of the Kosovar identity stands between two 
paradigms. The first paradigm notes that Kosovar national identity is being created 
and/or constructed as a consequence of the new political circumstances after the 
declaration of independence. As such this incorporates a particular approach of the 
analysis that would consider the development of state and institutions as necessary 
ingredients that would develop and combine with the incorporation of particular 
feelings of belonging that would lead to a process of nation-building (state-building) 
by consciousness-raising. As observed by Hobsbawm,8 insisting on consciousness or 
choice as the criterion of nationhood is insensible while subordinating the complex 
and multiple ways in which people and/or individuals define and redefine themselves 
as members of groups, to a single option: the choice of belonging to a ‘nation’ or 
‘nationality’. The second paradigm contradicts these approaches, in view of the 
consequences and challenges that such developments may have for Albanian national 
identity by excluding a great number of Albanians (who do not necessarily identify 
themselves as Kosovar Albanians) living outside of today’s Albania and Kosovo.  
Viewing Kosovar identity in the perspective of nationalism as defined by Gellner, who 
holds that “nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political 
and national unit should be congruent”,9 requires a more careful examination with 
regards to distinguishing other elements of understanding and the making of nations, 
incorporating elements such as invention or social engineering. 10  In this sense 
Kosovar identity does not seem natural as the political and national unit do not seem 
to be congruent simply because the national unit remains the Albanian identity while 
the political unit remains the independent Kosovo which includes other different 
ethnicities, the majority of which consider themselves as Albanians. However, if one 
views ‘nation’ as something fluid, dynamic and in constant flux, due to changes in 
4 E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Cornell University Press, New York, Paperback edition, 2008; A. Smith, 
National Identity, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1991; B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the 
Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Verso, London/New York, Revised Edition, 2006; Anderson, op. cit.; E. J. 
Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2nd edition, 1992 
Hobsbawm, op. cit.  
5 T.H. Eriksen, ‘Ethnic Identity, National Identity and Intergroup Conflict: The Significance of Personal 
Experiences’, in R. D. Ashmore, L. Jussim and D. Wilder (eds) Social Identity, Intergroup Conflict, and Conflict 
Reduction, Volume 3, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, pp. 42-68, p. 62 
6 Anderson, op. cit.  
7 Hobsbawm, op. cit. 
8 ibid., p. 8 
9 Gellner, op. cit., p. 1 
10 ibid., pp. 47-49 
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social and political alternatives, rather than as an unchanging static entity, then 
Kosovar identity does seem to have some basis from which to evolve.  
This paper analyses the assertion of existence or non-existence of the Kosovar 
identity as a national one, viewed as challenging the Albanian national identity. The 
article argues that Kosovar identity does have solid potential to evolve into a national 
one, however this process is characterised with more complexities than language 
dialect differences or even the existence of the Kosovo state. The article is organised 
in three sections. The first section examines the Albanian identity, providing a brief 
view of its formation and empowerment and its effect on Albanians living in the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). The second section explores the 
premises promulgated in the debate about the development of Kosovar identity 
through the Albanian language dialect differences. The final section examines the 
prospects of the development of Kosovo identity as a national one following the new 
political circumstances after the declaration of independence of Kosovo.  
Albanian national identity 
Albanian nationalism did develop in similar political contexts and in a similar period 
of time, as did all other nationalisms in the Balkans. 11  However, there were 
differences in the ways in which these nationalist ideas were constructed or 
manifested and how nationalism was used to construct a nation and a nation-state. 
What can be considered as a late development in Albanian nationalism and hence in 
Albanian national identity is the distribution of such nationalistic ideas throughout 
the Albanian population in the Balkans and the use of such ideas to create a unified 
awareness of a common national identity.12 The lack of a single cultural or even 
religious administrative centre that would serve as a mechanism for the construction, 
engineering and distribution of national codes, symbols, myths or history, impacted 
the development of national identity.13  
Political circumstances related to social circumstances created the conditions for such 
social change, as it is generally understood through the terms of a specific ideology of 
the European tradition of understanding of nationalism stating that each nation 
should possess its own state or at least some degree of territorial self-
determination.14 Such a prospect is hard to apply in the context of Albanians living 
under the Ottoman rule because the state was nonexistent and there was no centrally 
organised mechanism in the form of either religion or state.  
Religion for Albanians did not play the role it did for other nations of the Balkans, 
due to the fact that Albanians have a very relaxed attitude towards religion in general. 
Albanian national identity is built on elements such as language, culture and history, 
while religion still remains only an individual way of expressing a spiritual 
consciousness rather than an identification. The Albanian intellectual elites of 19th 
and early 20th centuries viewed religion as problematic for the development of 
national identity. Constructing a national identity based on religion was simply seen 
11 Clayer, op. cit., p. 637 
12 ibid., pp. 637-640 
13 P. Misha, ‘Invention of a Nationalism: Myth and Amnesia’, in S. Schwandner-Sievers, & B. J. Fischer (eds) 
Albanian Identities: Myth and History, Indiana University Press, Bloomington & Indianapolis, 2002, pp. 33-48. 
p. 37 
14 L.E. Cederman, ‘Nationalism and Ethnicity’, in Carlsnaes, W., Risse, T & Simmons, B.A. (eds), Handbook of 
International Relations, Sage, London, 2002, pp. 409-428. p. 411 
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as dangerous, dysfunctional and unrealistic based on the political, social and religious 
situation of Albanians in the Balkans. Dangerous because such an identification 
would not create a national identity but quite the contrary would divide Albanians 
and prevent the development of a common identity due to the risk of being 
marginalised in already established religious identifications in the Balkans. Such an 
identification would leave out a significant part of the same population (and 
territories) that used Albanian as their mother tongue. Dysfunctional because 
Albanians had failed to establish national centres of religious management or 
administration. Unrealistic because religious identification would cause confusion 
and perhaps ideological and social anarchy due to the fact that the struggles for 
freedom that created myths, legends and heroes were national and not religious. The 
attitude and the approach of the “Religion of Albanians is Albanian-ism” a verse 
from the poem “Oh Albania, Poor Albania” by Pashko Vasa, a prominent Albanian 
figure, Ottoman Governor of Lebanon (catholic by religion), published in 1881 by Jan 
Urban Jarník, a Czech linguist,15 became the slogan and the phrase that was fated to 
become the most famous and used phrase in Albanian contemporary history. 16 
Albanian culture, the feeling of common kinship and especially the Albanian 
language became the central elements of Albanian nationalism. 17 These elements 
remained strongly in use especially by Albanians living in the SFRY.  
The struggle of Albanians in the SFRY and especially of those in Kosovo to have their 
nation status recognised in federal terms and the political implication and 
consequently denial of such status within the SFRY strengthened even further the 
Albanian identity. Having in mind the political circumstances in the SFRY and the 
differences between them and the surrounding Slavic communities, the general 
Albanian identification was something natural and an uncompromising social and 
political element not only in Kosovo but also for Albanians living in the SFRY 
republics of Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia. In this context Kosovar identity 
existed merely as a regional identity that Albanians living in Kosovo would use to 
emphasise a closer geographical identification between themselves. Albanian 
national identity was an element that kept the Albanians in the SFRY tied to Albania 
at least in a virtual and often an emotional way.  
Communist Albania created a modern infrastructure to foster the national identity, 
portraying the communist victory as the main way of protecting Albanianism. 
However, to do so, other previous elements from history were taken into account, 
especially elements that would suggest the struggle and the victorious battles to 
protect anything Albanian, starting from the 15th century struggles against Ottomans 
to the communist victory in WWII through their partisan struggle.18 
The isolation of communist Albania impacted the development of Albanian national 
identity. Despite the policies of unification of Albanian elements of society, through 
educational development and exchange of literature and educational materials in 
general, or the unification of the language by a particular standard norm, the 
isolation of Albania still impacted Albanians living outside Albanian state. They 
15 R. Elsie, History of Albanian Literature Vol 2, Columbia University Press, New York, 1995, pp. 262-264 
16 Clayer, op.cit., p. 257 
17 S. Skendi, The Albanian National Awakening 1878-1912, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1967, p. 469 
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developed in different political, social and economic circumstances. These differences 
started to surface more after the fall of communism and the opening of Albania. 
Albanian language dialect differences  
Albanian language has two main dialects, Southern (Tosk dialect) and Northern 
(Gheg dialect). Writings in Albanian appeared first in the northern dialect and later 
in both dialects throughout the centuries until the language was finally standardised 
in 1972 in the Congress for the Standardisation of the Language held in Tirana. The 
basis of the standard language was to be the Southern dialect, despite an initial idea 
to amalgamate Gheg and Tosk. 
This standardisation resulted in a common written language to be used by all 
Albanians in the world. However, the use of this standard in the spoken speech is 
extremely limited even today. The debate on the Albanian standard language 
‘mistakes’ and the ‘injustices’, done to the northern dialect of Gheg, started to appear 
in late 1980s at the academic level. 19  The standard language and the dialect 
differences have triggered a great debate, especially in Kosovo, about the standard 
language not serving the main purpose of its establishment, that of unifying the 
nation in one spoken and written language. This debate brought about many 
personalities that concurred with the premise that the standard language did not 
serve its ultimate purpose of unification of the people and called for a possible revisit 
of the standard or a standardisation of the Gheg dialect. It also provoked a 
considerable opposition. Kristo Frasheri, an Albanian historian, argued that the 
possibility of two dialects becoming two standards would lead to the creation of two 
national identities similar to Serbs and Croats.20  
These differences have led to an element of differentiation between Albanians in the 
two countries in terms of ‘them’ and ‘us’. Whether this seems to be the beginning of a 
very long journey towards a new identity remains to be seen. Hobsbawm notes that 
multiple identities lies behind even national homogeneity.21 He uses the example of 
Germans and their identification according to regions or ‘tribes’, considering 
themselves as being Saxons, Swabians or Bavarians or members of a German 
principality or state, but with a single standard written language.22 
Viewing the emergence of the Kosovar identity based on the differences of the 
dialects does not seem to cover all complex elements that a national identity would 
require but seems to limit it to a regional identity. How such identity can be 
maintained to a regional level or develop to a national one, depends a lot on political 
and economic circumstances that play a crucial role in the development of a 
particular sense of belonging.  
Kosovar (national) identity 
The debate about Kosovar national identity is relatively new and encouraged after the 
Kosovo war of 1998-99. It is mainly carried on through discussions in the media 
19 A. Pipa, The Politics of Language in Socialist Albania, Boulder: East European Monographs, 1989 
20 Koha Ditore, Kristo Frashëri: Dy standard na çojnë në 2 kombe, si serbët e kroatët, 5 May 2014, 
http://archive.koha.net/?id=4&l=8851, accessed on 20 April 2017  
21 E.J. Hobsbawm, “Language, Culture and National Identity”, Social Research, Vol. 63, No. 4, pp. 1065-1080, p. 
1067 
22 ibid. pp. 1067-1068 
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throughout Albanian space in the Balkans but also in the academic level, albeit 
limited. Two most vocal figures engaged in this discussion in Kosovo are Nexhmedin 
Spahiu, a scholar, and Halil Matoshi, philosopher and journalist. Spahiu discussed 
the development of Kosovar identity into a national one more extensively in his book 
‘Towards Kosovar Nation’ where he defines the nation as a ‘capable society to 
establish a state’. 23  He considers the building of Kosovar national identity as a 
political enterprise modifying and adjusting aspects of Albanian culture and national 
symbols to Kosovo circumstances.24 Matoshi on the other hand, seems to take a 
stronger position about the process of the development of the Kosovar identity into a 
national one inviting to distinguish between the concepts of civic and ethnic national 
identity, therefore the political and cultural identities.25 He sees the Kosovar identity 
on practical terms that contributes to the strengthening of the Kosovo independence 
providing other non-Albanian communities a sense of belonging to a multiethnic 
state. Matoshi does not suggest that the development of Kosovar identity into a 
national one will automatically translate into the non-existence or dismissal of the 
Albanian ethnicity as this sentiment will continue to exist, however the strengthening 
of Kosovar identity based on citizenry will only mean compatibility with an ever 
globalised and multicultural world.26  
This debate however, has triggered a very strong opposition to such claims. The 
counter argumentations to these theses mainly hold that Kosovar identity exists only 
as a regional one and as an integral part of the larger Albanian identity27 and that the 
loyalty towards the Kosovar identity means abandonment from the loyalty of the 
Albanian identity. 28 The debate is powerful enough to provoke emotional responses 
especially from many of those who oppose such claims often qualifying those who 
defend such claims as anti-Albanians. Consequently, it often leads to misreading the 
original positions presenting those as efforts to replace the Albanian identity with an 
artificial Kosovar identity 29  reminiscent of the old Yugoslav identity, doomed to 
failure. 30  
The engagement in opposing of the Kosovar national identity thesis attracted also 
some reputable Kosovo academics such as Rexhep Qosja and Mehmet Kraja. Qosja is 
more comprehensive in his analysis and views the development of the Kosovar 
national identity in terms of the idea of the national unification31 and considers such 
‘Kosovarisation’ as a counter-historical ideology that ultimately challenges the very 
core basis of the Albanianism that has shaped the history of Albanian people since 
23 N. Spahiu, Drejt Kombit Kosovar, Mitrovica: Botim Privat, 2004, p. 3 
24 Ibid., pp. 5-7 
25 H. Matoshi, ‘‘Kosova: Ndërtimi (i vështirë) i një kombi’, Shenja, 2 October 2016, http://shenja.tv/kosova-
ndertimi-i-veshtire-i-nje-kombi/, accessed on 20th April 2017 
26 H. Matoshi, ‘Identiteti kulturor Kosovar është evropian dhe kozmopolitan’, Reporteri, 10 August 2012, 
http://reporteri.net/?page=1,7,410, accessed on 21st April 2017 
27 V. Murati, ‘A ekziston identiteti Kosovar?’, Shekulli, 17 May 2004 
28 M. Krasniqi, ‘Për identitetin: Shqiptar apo Kosovar?’, Kosovain, 18 June 2012, 
http://kosovain.eu/sq/Opinione/14076, accessed on 20th April 2017 
29 B. Bislimi, ‘Identiteti Kosovar, real apo artificial’, Radio Evropa e Lirë, 28 November 2011, 
http://www.evropaelire.org/a/24404415.html, accessed on 20th April 2017 
30 X. Bislimi, ‘”Kombi” i Jugokosovareve të sojit Halil Matoshi’, Kosovapress, 20 May 2016, 
http://www.kosovapress.com/sq/opinione/xhevatbislimi/kombi-i-jugokosovareve-te-sojit-halil-matoshi-73487/, 
accessed on 20th of April 2017 
31 National unification here is meant the unification of geographical space where ethnic Albanians make up the 
majority of population with Albania proper. This is a completely different wide topic, which is not covered in this 
paper.   
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the Prizren League in 1878 to present.32 Kraja, on his voluminous book ‘Kosovar 
Identity’ offers limited sourced explanations to counter argument the thesis of the 
Kosovar national identity mostly tautologically suggesting that this identity as such 
will not survive despite the contemporary efforts to construct one just as the Yugoslav 
identity did not survive within Albanians in Kosovo.33 In turn, the defenders of the 
Kosovar identity strengthened their claims to extremes to suggest that the identity is 
already developed and that now with the consolidation of the state of Kosovo such 
identity will only empower in the future.  
Both these positions hold valid points. An entity that is bound to a particular political 
territory and a consolidated state does have all the potential to develop into a 
national identity. Kosovo case does have its own particularities and the Albanian 
identity was closely tied up to the majority population of Kosovo since this identity 
was conceived in the 19th century. The development of the Kosovar identity may turn 
into a national one but as a consequence could require that the Albanian one becomes 
obsolete. This is something that requires time and is closely depended on the political 
circumstances. The numerous attempts to define a nation through a variety of 
theories required that such theories are adjustable to different circumstances many 
nations went throughout their journeys to develop and strengthen the sentiment of 
national identity. A particular theory is validated on certain given circumstances.  
Many who contribute to the Kosovar national identity debate seem to follow Weber’s 
definition of the ‘nation’ as ‘a community of sentiment, which would adequately 
manifest itself in a state of its own’ and that would ‘tend to produce a state of its 
own’. 34  Such an approach requires a more careful examination as often the 
coincidence of the state and the nation should be treated as a historical contingency 
rather than a case of conceptual unity.35 Another perspective to consider is the inter-
subjective understanding of belonging that the diversity of human language creates 
through print technology 36  (or digital communication) today. Such a perspective 
leads to the creation of a particular ‘social construction of reality’.37 Such approaches 
pose different questions. How do Kosovo Albanians imagine themselves? If they 
imagine themselves as Kosovars, where is the position of the Albanian identity in 
such an imagining? Are all ethnic communities of Kosovo included in such 
identification? Further investigation and empirical studies are required in order to 
build a better understanding for such questions.  
The University of Oslo conducted an empirical study on the creation of national 
identities in 2011 in the Western Balkans.38 The findings were published in Albanian 
also.39 The survey of this study, conducted in the second half of 2011, engaged 1389 
respondents, of Albanian ethnicity. The survey found that 83% of respondents wished 
that the future of Kosovo were a fully independent state without any international 
supervision, 3% with international supervision and only 14% as united with 
32 R. Qosja, Ideologjia e shpërbërjes: trajtesë mbi idetë çintegruese në shoqërinë e sotme shqiptare, Toena, Tiranë, 
2006, p. 49 
33 M. Kraja, Identiteti Kosovar: publicistikë, PEN Qendra e Kosovës, Prishtinë, 2011, p. 199 
34 M. Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Oxford University Press, New York, 1946, p. 176 
35 W. Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994 
36 Anderson, op. cit. p. 46 
37 P. Berger and T. Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge, 
Anchor Books, New York, 1967 
38 P. Kolstø, (eds), Strategies of Symbolic Nation-building in South Eastern Europe, Routledge, London & New 
York, 2016 
39 Kombformimi simbolik në Evropën juglindore, Qendra për Hulumtime dhe Politikë Gjinore, Prishtinë, 2013 
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Albania. 40 On the statement that they agree that there is a Kosovo nation, 23% 
disagreed (fully or mostly) and 63% agreed (fully or mostly).41 However, respondents 
primarily would identify themselves as Kosovo Albanians 55%, Kosovars 26% and 
Albanians 19%. 42  The Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development 
(KIPRED) published a study in 2016, on the impact of religion on the ethnic identity 
where they conducted a public opinion analysis. 43  The survey engaged 1000 
respondents of Albanian ethnicity. In the question ‘Which from these categories 
describe best how you feel?’ 44% responded as Albanian then Kosovar, 32% Kosovar 
then Albanian, 17% Albanian and 7% Kosovar.44 This change of public opinion in 5 
years suggests that the existence of Kosovar national identity remains blurry, due to 
Albanian identity being in a central position and due to the fact that Kosovo is still 
not consolidated as a stable political and economic entity. 
Albanian identity remains very strong in Kosovo mostly because the relations with 
Serbia are often hostile. In a hostile political environment, the regional identity 
diminishes in importance in comparison with the national one while in a secure 
political and prosperous economic environment identities tend to be more fluid and 
open to change. With regards to Kosovo relations with the outside world the 
hypothesis of Kosovo national identity seems to be strengthened. Kosovo as an 
independent entity with its own national/state symbols is another element that 
cannot be ignored. Despite the fact that the Kosovo flag and other state symbols do 
not represent any Albanian symbolism, “reflecting its multi-ethnic character” as per 
the Ahtisaari Plan45 and the initial hesitation of Albanians to use them, still these 
symbols are used every day, strengthening the Kosovar citizenship factor. Ahtisaari 
Plan, which is the basis of the Kosovo constitution, envisaged establishing a Kosovar 
political identity based on citizenry and citizenship. Pula, however, argues that this is 
not the case as this concept prejudges the ethnicity and categorises every individual 
as members of specific ‘communities’ while not even acknowledging the ‘community’ 
as a nation in miniature.46 
Officially, the citizens of Kosovo are called Kosovars, including all minorities living in 
Kosovo. In terms of the citizenship Kosovar identity is a national one representing 
the state identity. This is the beginning of the new national identity with the 
perspective to be strengthened with time. Wendt notes that given the importance of 
identities, a classification of theories should be able to represent different ‘levels of 
construction’.47 In such a perspective, the Albanian identity in Kosovo still remains 
strong and it seems that it will continue to be so for a period of time, although one 
can never be certain that such an identity is not on the move. The nationalists’ 
primordial ideological construction that the Albanian nation is a naturally given 
entity is seriously challenged. 
40 IPSOS Strategic Market, ‘Report – Nation Building: Kosovo’, 2011, 
http://www.hf.uio.no/ilos/forskning/prosjekter/nation-w-balkan/dokumenter/nb_kosovo.pdf, p. 52 
41 Ibid., p. 76 
42 Ibid., p. 77 
43 KIPRED, ‘What happened to Kosovo Albanians: The impact of religion on the ethnic identity in the state-
building period’, Policy Paper, No. 1/16, June 2016, 
http://www.kipred.org/repository/docs/What_happened_to_Kosovo_Albanians_740443.pdf  
44 Ibid., p. 72 
45 UNSC, Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, 26 March 2007, General Principles, Article 
1.7. p.2, www.unosek.org/docref/Comprehensive_proposal-english.pdf accessed on 27th February 2017  
46 B. Pula, ‘Kush e konstituon shtetin e Kosovës? Qytetaria dhe komuniteti në Kosovën Ahtisaariane’, Identiteti 
Evropian i Kosovës: simpozium ndërkombëtar, i mbajtur më 26 dhe 27 Qershor 2007 në Prishtinë, Prishtina: 
Forum2015, 2007, pp. 109-112, p. 110 
47 A. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 244 
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The debate in Kosovo, however, should also consider other aspects of identity 
formation such as instrumentalist terms following March and Olsen’s ‘logic of 
consequences’ 48  emphasizing identity reproducing institutions. While 
instrumentalists view identities as fluid and subject to free individual choice, the 
institutionalists, in contrast, seem to be more prone to regard identity as being 
ascribed (through a constitutional framework) rather than chosen, in a way locking 
individuals into a path-dependent collective identification process.49 Analysing the 
emergence of the Kosovar identity a combination of both these perspectives seems in 
order. Firstly, acknowledge that the national identity is a changing process. Secondly, 
institutions play an important role in the consolidation and strengthening of national 
identity. People in Kosovo today identify with those institutions and such 
identification will only be strengthened in the future.  
Another aspect to be taken into account is the history of Kosovo Albanians over the 
last two decades and their struggle for freedom from Serbian rule. This is significant 
in the sense of national awareness and national feelings of sacrifice and struggle for 
physical survival. As such the struggle for independence, i.e. for the creation and 
establishment of a new state, is another important element to consider when 
discussing national identity. Kosovar Albanians are proud of such a political and 
historical achievement. The element of pride, inter-related to the element of sacrifice, 
is also an important factor when it comes to the construction or the imagining of 
national identity. In this sense Kosovar national identity in political terms will 
continue to be present and strengthen with time. 
Conclusions 
The presence of the debate on Kosovar identity speaks for itself if such a process is 
developing. Whether Kosovar identity will develop as a regional, political, legal or 
national identity depends on internal, regional and international political 
developments that may affect it. The successful consolidation of the Kosovo state with 
prosperous economic perspective where its citizens can look forward to proudly 
identify with may eventually enable the Kosovar identity to form as a national 
identity.50 The position that Kosovar identity today is a national identity may be a 
premature conclusion mostly because Kosovo state is still in its initial phase of 
consolidation and has yet a long journey to develop as a sustainable independent 
state. Moreover, the Kosovo state continues to be contested and its perspective to join 
the EU is solid but very unclear, given the developments within the EU itself. The 
questions that Anthony D. Smith asked back in 1992 whether the European identity 
as a supranational political identity, in the form of the EU, will come to conflict with 
national ones in times of crisis seem to have a great degree of relevance today.51 In 
the context of the Kosovar identity with any possible competing identities in times of 
crisis it may be premature and intellectually indefensible to suggest that the power of 
48 J.G. March & J.P. Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders”, International 
Organisations, Vol. 52, No. 4, Autumn 1998, pp. 943-969, pp. 949-951 
49 C. Calhoun, Nationalism, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp. 30-33, from L.E. Cederman, 
“Nationalism and Ethnicity” in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse & B.A. Simmons (eds), Handbook of International 
Relations, Sage, London, 2002, pp. 409-428, p. 412 
50 A. Andersen, ‘The Kosovar Identity and Statehood’, in Identiteti Evropian i Kosovës: simpozium 
ndërkombëtar, i mbajtur më 26 dhe 27 Qershor 2007 në Prishtinë, Prishtina: Forum2015, 2007, pp. 105-108, p. 
105 
51 A. D. Smith, ‘National Identity and the Idea of European Union’, International Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 1, January 
1992, pp. 55-76, p. 56 
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Albanian identity would not prevail. The more this consolidation is challenged by 
regional and international politics that creates any sort of insecurities the Albanian 
national identity will remain more powerful.  
The experiences of the Albanian population in the SFRY have constantly been 
characterised with violent identity politics including episodes of ethnic cleansing in 
the last Kosovo war. The relevance of such experiences is mainly related to the 
strengthening of the Albanian identity. Consequently, for such identity to be more 
flexible and fluid and evolve into a particular Kosovo national identity the new state 
of Kosovo must experience a considerable period of political stability, security and 
economic progress as well as an institutional life that is closely connected to the 
people. However, the very long struggle of identity politics experienced by the 
Albanian population in the SFRY may be also used as a symbol of the establishment 
of the new Kosovar national identity if manifested in a successful consolidation of the 
Kosovo political and economic independence. To read Zygmunt Bauman in reverse 
when he discusses the fluid character of human identification and points out that “If 
the modern ‘problem of identity’ is how to construct an identity and keep it solid and 
stable, the postmodern ‘problem of identity’ is primarily how to avoid fixation and 
keep the options open’,52 in Kosovo context the open options may not mean new 
identity by the old identity. Today Kosovo has different political and social 
circumstances. National identity in Kosovo may still be imaginary however; the 
chances seem to be great that this will change with time.  
 
52 Z. Bauman, ‘From pilgrim to tourist; or a short history of identity’, in S. Hall & P Du Gay (eds), Questions of 
Cultural Identity, Sage, London, pp. 18-36, p. 18 
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